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P ROBABLY the most controversial of the covenants implied in oil
and gas leases is the covenant for additional development, more
fully stated as "the implied covenant to conduct additional develop-
ment after paying production is obtained." At least, the courts are
called upon to construe and interpret this covenant more often than
any of the others. The difficulty, of course, is that no two cases pre-
sent the same fact situations, and where the rule is fixed but the facts
vary in each case, precedents are not always conclusive.
It is noteworthy, also, that cases of this character very rarely, if
ever, involve leases where the production is substantially profitable.
In such case the lessee is usually just as eager as the lessor to extend
development which will produce more oil and return more profit
both to the lessor and lessee. In this respect the interests of the lessor
and lessee are identical. It is the marginal lease that produces the con-
flict of interest between the lessor and lessee.
When the initial well is drilled on a lease, both the lessee and lessor
are looking forward to securing paying production. If the first well
drilled is a small, unprofitable well (a "stinker" as it is called in the
oil fields) and the second well is no better, the lessee will ordinarily
become discouraged and will hesitate about incurring the heavy ex-
pense of further development, especially where it appears doubtful
that he will ever recover what he has already expended. The lessor,
though disappointed, is still eager and demands further drilling. His
eagerness and demands are stimulated by the fact that he will not
have to bear the expense of further drilling. That is not to say that
the lessor is always unreasonable and the lessee always reasonable.
The cases have adjudicated these controversies both ways. Neverthe-
less, it is frequently the case that where the lessee delays further
development, an action based upon the implied covenant of addi-
tional development follows.
* Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
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I. BASIS OF THE COVENANT
Generally, implied covenants in contracts have long been rec-
ognized. The basis of this rule in contracts other than oil, gas, and
mineral leases is that implied covenants exist only when it is necessary
that certain duties and obligations be implied in order to effect the
purposes of the parties as expressed in the contract.1 In construing
a mineral grant where the grantor reserved an interest and later
instituted an action for nondevelopment of the premises alleging a
breach of implied covenants, the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
"It is not enough to say that an implied covenant is necessary in
order to make the contract fair or that without such a covenant it
would be improvident or unwise, or that the contract would operate
unjustly. It must arise from the presumed intention of the parties
as gathered from the instrument as a whole."'  (Emphasis added.)
This rule appears to apply universally to contracts in general.3
In the case of oil and gas leases, however, the courts have gone
further in implying covenants than in other contracts. Where the
common law held that there was no obligation to work a mine in
the absence of an express covenant,' "the American courts have
liberalized the rule, especially in sales of minerals and mineral rights,
in oil and gas leases, and have found an implied covenant for diligent
and reasonable development and operation in leases which make the
lessor's compensation depend upon development and operation."' In
a number of cases the courts have said that the implied covenant of
development should be construed to "promote development."' And
the Supreme Court of Texas has said: "The true rule is that the
implied covenant arises only out of necessity . . . in order that the
purpose for which the lease is made, the production of oil and gas
with payment of royalty to the lessor, may be accomplished."' (Em-
phasis added.) The Supreme Court of the United States has stated
'Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S.W.2d
1039 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 890 (1929).2 Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 490, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (1941),
137 A.L.R. 408 (1942).
'Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950); Stern v. Dunlap
Co., 228 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1955); Grass v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84
S.E. 750 (1915).
'Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 455 (2d ed. 1940).
'Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 451, 6 S.W.2d
1039, 1042 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 890 (1929).
eCrain v. Pure Oil Co., 25 F.2d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 1928); see also Tamsk v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 158 Kan. 747, 150 P.2d 326 (1944); Severson v. Barstow, 103 Mont.
526, 63 P.2d 1022 (1936); Mistletoe Oil & Gas Co. v. Revelle, 117 Okla. 144, 245 Pac.
620 (1926); Garfield Oil Co. v. Champlin, 78 Okla. 91, 189 Pac. 514 (1920).
7Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 129 Tex. 487, 492, 103 S.W.2d 965, 968 (1937).
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that the implied covenant is based upon "the relation of the parties
and the object of the lease."'
There is a wide difference of opinion as to whether implied cov-
enants in an oil and gas lease are implied in fact or in law. One
authority concludes that "the implication is viewed as one of fact
and not of law."' Another thinks the implication is one of law, be-
cause "there is no basis upon which we can infer that lessors and
lessees have in mind the implied covenant obligations when they
contract.""
The decisions are, nevertheless, consistent in holding that the cov-
enant is a flexible obligation in applying to leases where there are no
express provisions as to exploration and development. The obligation
to drill or develop arises from the "facts and circumstances" of each
case, and the extent to which it is applied depends upon the condi-
tions existing in each situation where the covenant is invoked.1"
Viewed from this standpoint, the covenant might well be regarded
as one of fact. However, the courts have experienced little difficulty
in applying and enforcing the covenant regardless of whether its
basis is in law or in fact.
II. IMPLIED DRILLING COVENANTS OTHER THAN FOR
ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Three of the five" generally recognized covenants implied in oil
and gas leases deal with drilling and development. Brief mention
will be made of the two other than the covenant for additional drill-
ing before entering upon a lengthy discussion of the latter.
A. The Implied Covenant to Drill an Exploratory Well
This covenant arises in cases where a lease is granted without
specifying any time within which the work of exploration shall be
commenced and the lease contains no express provisions for delaying
8Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934), 93 A.L.R. 454.
'Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 11 Texas L. Rev. 339, 402 (1933).
"Merrill, op. cit. supra note 4, at 460, 463.
"Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); Daughetee v. Ohio Oil
Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914); Myers v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 153 Kan. 287,
110 P.2d 810 (1941); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W.2d 534
(1933), 91 A.L.R. 890 (1934); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187
(1933); Wilcox v. Ryndak, 174 Okla. 24, 49 P.2d 733 (1935); Pelham Petroleum Co.
v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117
Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 936 (1929); 2 Summers, Oil and Gas § 414,
at 365 (2d ed. 1938), and authorities cited therein.
"The other two implied covenants generally recognized are the implied covenant for




the commencement of a well, as by the delay rental clause or other
provision expressly referring to the time in which a well may be
commenced."3
B. The Implied Covenant to Protect the Leased
Premises Against Drainage
This obligation arises where there are producing wells on adjoin-
ing premises draining from the premises in question and it is shown
that a well on said premises would be sufficiently productive to pay
the lessee a profit over and above drilling and operating costs. 14
I1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT
OF ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENT
This is the covenant herein examined and discussed. One author-
ity calls it "The Implied Covenant to Drill Additional 'Wells.""s An-
other refers to it as "The Implied Covenant of the Lessee to Rea-
sonably Develop the Land After Discovery of Oil and Gas in Pay-
ing Quantities."'s A third names it "The Implied Covenant to
Develop with Reasonable Diligence." 7
Regardless of the name given the covenant, the writers and
authorities generally recognize that the covenant does not arise as to
any oil and gas lease unless and until (1) there has been drilling
and development on the lease, (2) oil or gas is being produced
thereon in paying quantities, and (3) there are no express provisions
in the lease defining the extent of drilling required of the lessee. In
such case it has been uniformly held that there is an implied coven-
ant to continue drilling or development with "reasonable diligence"
(as that term is defined by the authorities) until a sufficient number
of wells are drilled reasonably to develop the premises for oil and
gas purposes.
"aTypical cases dealing with this covenant are: Skinner v. Ajax Portland Cement Co.,
109 Kan. 72, 197 Pac. 875 (1921); Cole v. Butler, 103 Kan. 419, 173 Pac. 978 (1918);
Hitt v. Henderson, 112 Okla. 194, 240 Pac. 745 (1925); Gay v. Grinnan, 218 S.W.2d
1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.; Jacobs v. Robinson, 241 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922), rev'd on other grounds, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309 (1923); Guffey Petroleum
Co. v. Oliver, 79 S.W. 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904).
14 Representative cases applying this covenant are: Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Sellers,
174 F.2d 948 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Asso-
ciated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Ill.
App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950); Coyle v. North American Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 9
So. 2d 473 (1942); Franklin v. Wigton, 132 Okla. 236, 270 Pac. 1 (1928); Texas Pac.
Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 936 (1929);
States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 161 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.
w.o.m.
" Merrill, op. cit. supra note 4, at 128.
'a 2 Summers, op. cit. supra note 11, S 398.
7 Walker, op. cit. supra note 9, at 399, 411.
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A. Historical Background of the Covenant
In early cases when this covenant was beginning to take form, it
was compared with implied covenants in other contracts. The same
reasoning applied; that is, its purpose was to carry out the expressed
intention of the contracting parties. For example, the Supreme
Court of Ohio, in a leading case decided in 1897, reasoned:
There is no express covenant, condition, or agreement in the lease as
to the extent to which the lands should be developed, nor as to tlc
number of wells that should be drilled after the completion of the first
well. Is there an implied covenant, condition, or agreement as to such
development, or as to the drilling of a reasonable number of wells? On
principle, it would seem that there is such implied covenant in the
written instrument. When no time is fixed for the performance of a
contract, a reasonable time is implied. When a contract for the erection
of a house or other structure is silent as to the quality of the materials
or workmanship, it is implied that the same should be of reasonable
quality. In a lease of a farm for tillage on shares, it is implied that the
tenant shall cultivate the farm in the manner usually done by reason-
ably good farmers. So, under an oil lease which is silent as to the
number of wells to be drilled, there is an implied convenant that the
lessee shall reasonably develop the lands, and reasonably protect the
lines. The development and protection of lines which is thus implied
when the lease is silent is such as is usually found in the same business
of an ordinarily prudent man,-neither the highest nor lowest, but
about medium or average. We therefore hold, both on principle and
authority, that there is an implied covenant in this lease to reasonably
develop the lands, by drilling and operating such number of wells as
would be ordinarily required for the production of the oil contained in
such lands, and afford ordinary protection to the lines.18 (Emphasis
added.)
An early case construed a lease having no definite term but pro-
viding for a test well and for what should be done if oil were pro-
duced in paying quantities. There was no provision as to what should
be done if a dry hole was drilled. The test proved to be dry. Com-
paring this situation with that of other contracts where covenants
are implied, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
The rule in regard to contracts is that, where the parties have expressly
agreed on what shall be done, there is no room for the implication of
anything not so stipulated for, and this rule is equally applicable to
oil and 'gas leases as to other contracts. There is nothing peculiar about
them in this respect. But here the parties have provided for a test
well, and for what shall be done if it produces oil in paying quantities.
But the other contingency, that it proves dry, is not provided for, and
"Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502, 505 (1897).
1959]
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it is the omitted case that has occurred. The authorities are uniform
that, under such circumstances, there is an implied obligation on the
lessee to proceed with the exploration and development of the land
with reasonable diligence, according to the usual course of the business,
and a failure to do so amounts to an abandonment which will sustain
a re-entry by the lessor."
In an earlier case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had applied the
development covenant where the defendant owned the lease adjacent
to plaintiff's property and was draining oil from plaintiff's land
through wells on the adjoining property.0 This decision was offered
as authority in a later Pennsylvania drainage case where the facts
were somewhat similar but the element of fraud was absent.2 ' In
this case the court denied relief to the plaintiff, saying:
Every man who invests his money and labor in a business does it on
the confidence he has in being able to conduct it in his own way. No
court has any power to impose a different judgment on him however
erroneous it may deem his to be. Its right to interfere does not arise
until it has been shown clearly that he is not acting in good faith on
his business judgment, but fraudulently, with intent to obtain a dis-
honest advantage over the other party to the contract. 2
To a somewhat lesser degree other courts have given great weight
to the good-faith judgment of the lessee as to the obligation to drill
additional and development wells on the leased premises."2 As late
as 1933 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, after stating the "pru-
dent operator" rule, said: "A co-ordinate rule is that the honest
opinion of the lessee that the lease cannot be operated profitably or
protected from drainage is entitled to more weight than the opinion
of the lessor, or the experts or the judge who tries the case, or all
combined, in the absence on his part of fraud or bad faith."'4
Notwithstanding these cases which constitute the good faith and
"Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451, 44 Atl. 555, 556 (1899).
" Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 502, 35 AtI. 109 (1896).
2Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 45 Atl. 119 (1899).
"Id., 45 Atl. at 124. While the Kleppner case and the Colgan case were drainage
cases, nevertheless, the "courts have made no distinction in the application of covenants to
drill additional wells and covenants to protect against drainage." Ramsey Petroleum Corp.
v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1938).
23In Grass v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915), 1915E L.R.A.
1057, the court said:
In other words, the authorities hold that if, under such circumstances, the operator ex-
ercises a sound and honest judgment, and not unreasonable or arbitrary one, in continu-
ing operations for mineral oils, he has faithfully discharged the duties implied devolv-
ing upon him by virtue of the lease, although he may not exercise that high degree of
diligence which the exaggerated expectations of the landowner may demand.
See Kellar v. Crag, 126 Fed. 630 (4th Cir. 1903); Steele v. American Oil Dev. Co., 80
W. Va. 206, 92 S.E. 410 (1917), 1917E L.R.A. 975; Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co.,
73 W. Va. 215, 80 S.E. 368 (1913).
"4Central Ky. Nat'l Gas Co, v. Williams, 249 Ky. 242, 60 S.W.2d 580, 584 (1933).
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judgment of the lessee as the principal element in determining
whether further drilling or development should be conducted on a
producing lease, the weight of authority today is that this issue
should be decided on the basis of what that mythical figure, the
reasonably prudent operator, would do under the same or similar
circumstances.
This rule, which was being developed in earlier cases, finally be-
came crystallized and circumscribed in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co.," regarded today as the leading authority on the scope and extent
of implied covenants in oil and gas leases. The opinion in the
Brewster case was written in 1905 by Judge Van Devanter, then a
judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and later an outstand-
ing Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. It has been
cited as an authority on implied covenants and followed in more
than one hundred and fifty cases decided in our leading oil and gas
producing states, including decisions by the courts of Texas, Okla-
homa, California, Louisiana, Kansas, Illinois, Arkansas, Kentucky,
West Virginia, Montana, Wyoming, Michigan, and others.
The Brewster case arose in Kansas. An oil and gas lease gave the
lessee two years in which to drill a well on the leased premises and
provided that the time might be extended by the payment of an
annual rental from the expiration of the second year until the well
was drilled, and if no well should be drilled upon "said premises"
within five years the lease should be void. A well was drilled during
the fifth year which produced gas in paying quantity. No other
well was drilled on the lease for a period of fourteen months after
the expiraton of the five-year period, although many wells had been
drilled in the territory adjacent to and surrounding the leased pre-
mises. These wells produced oil and gas in paying quantities.
There were in this case the issues both of drainage and of the
drilling of additional wells on the leased premises. Instead of making
the judgment of the lessee determinative as to further drilling, the
court said that in the absence of some stipulation to that effect
neither the lessor nor the lessee would be the judge as to extent of
diligence to be practiced in developing a lease, but that both are
bound by the standard of what is reasonable. The test, therefore, is
"reasonable diligence."
1. The Meaning of Reasonable Diligence
The Brewster case sets forth at least three principles as included in
fixing the standard of "reasonable diligence." They are: (1) neither
25 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
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the lessor nor the lessee is the arbiter of the extent to which, or the
diligence with which, the operations shall proceed; (2) no obligation
rests upon the lessee to carry the operations beyond the point where
they will be profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor
will result from them; and (3) the test of diligence required of the
lessee is the "prudent operator" test; that is, whatever in the cir-
cumstances would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary
prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee,
is what is required. These three principles will be discussed separately
in the above order.
a. Extent and Diligence of Operations.-Neither the lessor nor
the lessee is the arbiter of the extent to which or the diligence with
which the operations shall proceed. This rule was articulated in the
Brewster case where the court said:
The object of the operations being to obtain a benefit or profit for
both lessor and lessee, it seems obvious, in the absence of some stipula-
tion to that effect, that neither is made the arbiter of the extent to
which or the diligence with which the operations shall proceed, and
that both are bound by the standard of what is reasonable. This is the
rule in respect of all other contracts where the time, mode or quality of
performance is not specified, and no reason is perceived why it should
not be equally applicable to oil and gas leases." (Emphasis added.)
This statement in the opinion followed a reference to and quota-
tions from the cases of Keller v. Craig"' and Colgan v. Forest Oil
Co." to the effect that the good-faith judgment of the lessee as to
additional drilling was conclusive. The court in the Brewster case
asserted its belief that this view is unsound and instead held that
neither party is the arbiter, but that both are bound by the standard
of what is reasonable.
The foregoing statement has been approved and applied generally
by the courts throughout the oil-producing states." It is recognized
that the drilling of wells and development of a lease is an expensive
2 Id. at 814.
27 126 Fed. 630 (4th Cir. 1903).
28 194 Pa. 234, 45 Atl. 119 (1899), 75 Am. St. Rep. 695 (1900).
" The following cases are representative: Becker v. Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App.
698, 204 Pac. 245 (1921); Greenwood v. Texas Interstate Pipe Line Co., 143 Kan. 686,
56 P.2d 431 (1936); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W.2d 534,
537 (1933), 91 A.L.R. 890, which refers to the Brewster case as the "principal case" on
this covenant; Severson v. Barstow, 103 Mont. 526, 63 P.2d 1022 (1936); Robinson v.
Miracle, 146 Okla. 31, 293 Pac. 211, 213 (1930); Scott v. Price. 123 Okla. 172, 247
Pac. 103, 105 (1926); Donaldson v. Josey Oil Co., 106 Okla. 11, 232 Pac. 821 (1924);
Indiana Oil, Gas & Dev. Co. v. McCrory, 42 Okla. 136, 140 Pac. 610 (1914); Rhoads
Drilling Co. v. Allred, 123 Tex. 229, 70 S.W.2d 576, 585 (1934); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil
Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 432, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1036 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 936 (1929);
South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961, 962 (1912), 43 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 848 (1913), refers to the Brewster case as "a very clear and able exposition."
[Vol. 13
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operation. A lessee should not be required to spend large sums for
this purpose merely upon demand of the lessor. Likewise, the lessor
should not be denied proper and prudent development of his prop-
erty, especially since the principal consideration for executing his
lease is the expectation of royalty.
b. Obligation to Conduct Operations Where Unprofitable.-No
obligation rests upon the lessee to carry the operations beyond the
point where they will be profitable to him even if some benefit to
the lessor will result from them. This statement is taken from the
Brewster case. The opinion then says: "It is only to the end that
the oil and gas shall be extracted with benefit or profit to both that
reasonable diligence is required."3
The rule in the Brewster case is followed in Texas. Quoting di-
rectly from that case, the Supreme Court of Texas held in a leading
cases" that no obligation rests on the lessee to carry the operations
beyond the point where they will be profitable to him, even if some
benefit to the lessor will result from them. Continuing, the Court
said: "Plaintiff was entitled to have the court give a charge such as
it requested to the effect that it was under no duty to drill wells, at
a loss to itself, for protection or for further development." The
Court then quotes further from the Brewster case: "'The large ex-
pense incident to the work of exploration and development, and the
fact that the lessee must bear the loss if the operations are not suc-
cessful, requires that he proceed with due regard to his own in-
terests, as well as those of the lessor.' " 2
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, citing the rule in the Brewster
case, has said that "no obligation rests on the lessee of an oil and
gas lease to carry operations beyond the point where they will be
profitable to it, even though some benefit to the lessor might result
therefrom."3
'
5 Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).
"'Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 432, 6 S.W.2d 1031, 1036
(1928), 60 A.L.R. 936, 7 Texas L. Rev. 438 (1929).
"2Id. at 433, 6 S.W.2d at 1036. Other Texas cases announcing and following this rule
are: Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 123 Tex. 229, 70 S.W.2d 576 (1934); Texas Co. v.
Ramsower, 10 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Senter v. Shanafelt, 233 S.W.2d
202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Hutchins v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 161 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.; State Line Oil & Gas Co. v. Thomas, 35 S.W.2d 746
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
"sEmpire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Haggard, 152 Okla. 35, 3 P.2d 675, 677 (1931). Other
Oklahoma cases following this rule are: Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149
F.2d 444, 445 (10th Cir. 1945); Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 100 F.2d 945, 950 (10th
Cir. 1939); Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1930); Smith v. McGill, 12
F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1926); Ramsey Petroleum Co. v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427
(1938); Wilcox v. Ryndak, 174 Okla. 24, 49 P.2d 733 (1935); Robinson v. Miracle, 146
Okla. 31, 293 Pac. 211, 213 (1930); Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 Pac.
104, 105 (1918).
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In Kansas, the supreme court in Meyers v. Shell Petroleum Co.
said: "A lessee is under no implied duty to engage in an undertak-
ing which is unprofitable to him, although it might, or would, re-
sult in some profit to the lessor .... It is only to the end of mutual
benefit or profit to both lessor and lessee that reasonable diligence
is required."3 The case cites the Brewster case among other author-
ities.
A case arising in Louisiana held: "Under the implied covenant to
develop, a lessee is not required to drill where the available informa-
tion indicates a strong probability that the well will not pay out.'' "
There is one situation in which the reasonable expectation of pro-
fit requirement has been made subject to general equitable principles;
that is where the failure to drill or develop has continued for an
unreasonable length of time in view of all the facts and circum-
stances of the case. In Oklahoma, for example, the supreme court
held in the Doss case"6 that a prima facie case of breach of the cov-
enant could be established by showing a failure to conduct further
development for an "unreasonable length of time." The effect of
this holding in Oklahoma is to shift the burden of proceeding to the
defendant to justify the delay in drilling.
Prior to the decision in the Doss case, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had held that there could be "abandonment" of a lease or the
undeveloped portion thereof even though the lessee did not evidence
an intention to abandon.37 In the Doss case the court overruled the
Booker case and other cases and said it would leave the doctrine of
abandonment to be applied to those cases "where intention to aban-
don is accompanied by physical relinquishment." However, the
34 153 Kan. 295, 296, 110 P.2d 811, 816 (1941); see Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95, 99 (1943), rehearing denied, 156 Kan. 722, 137 P.2d
139 (1943); Greenwood v. Texas Interstate Pipe Line Co., 143 Kan. 686, 56 P.2d 431
(1936); Harris v. Morris Plan Co., 144 Kan. 501, 61 P.2d 901 (1936).
asCoastal Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 51 F. Supp. 819, 825 (W.D. La. 1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 141 F.2d 245 (1944). For cases reported from other jurisdictions, see
Keenan v. Texas Prod. Co., 84 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1936); Humphreys Oil Co. v. Tatum,
26 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1928); Copple v. Carter Oil Co., 44 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Ill. 1942);
Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308, 310 (1914); George v. Franklin,
219 Ky. 377, 292 S.W. 1093 (1927); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d
187, 192 (1933); Hays v. Bowser, 110 W. Va. 323, 158 S.E. 169 (1931); Grass v. Big
Creek Dev. Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915), 1915E L.R.A. 1057; Jennings v.
Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S.E. 368 (1913); Hall v. South Penn Oil Co.,
71 W. Va. 82, 76 S.E. 124 (1912).
asDoss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943). Other
Oklahoma cases following the Doss case are: Texas Consol. Oils v. Vann, 208 Okla. 673,
258 P.2d 679 (1953); Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla. 289, 228 P.2d 1000 (1950); Bain v.
Portable Drilling Corp., 200 Okla. 569, 198 P.2d 207 (1948); Ferguson v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
192 Okla. 355, 137 P.2d 940 (1943); Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles, 193 Okla. 308, 142 P.2d
969 (1943); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Rockhold, 192 Okla. 628, 138 P.2d 809 (1943).
"
7 Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1926).
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court said that the lessor would not be left without remedy where
there was an unreasonable delay in development, and then said that
"we think the rights heretofore granted under the theory of aban-
donment should be granted under the true doctrine of breach of
the implied covenant to fully develop." 8 Apparently the court holds
that the "unreasonable delay" which should now be applied in con-
nection with the implied covenant to develop fully should be the
same in point of time as that formerly required to constitute aban-
donment. Furthermore, whether or not the delay in any case is un-
reasonable is to be determined from all the facts and circumstances
of the particular case. In a later Oklahoma case" it was held that
a delay of seven years was not unreasonable; and in a case arising in
Oklahoma and decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals it
was said: "No hard or fast rule can be laid down as to what con-
stitutes an unreasonable delay. Ten years may not be unreasonable
in one case while five years may be unreasonable in another. Each
case depends upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances."4
In another Oklahoma case, decided after the Doss case, the su-
preme court said that "after the passage of a reasonable length of
time the duty to drill additional wells becomes progressively greater,
and the standard of the prudent operator becomes progressively of
less importance in determining whether such duty exists.'"'
In Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 4 a period of seven-
teen years had elapsed since two wells were drilled on a 360 acre
lease without further development, and the lessees had testified they
had no intention of "drilling at any time in the near or remote
future." The court held that "this attitude does not comport with
the obligation to prosecute development with due regard to the in-
terests of the lessor," and that the petitioners were entitled to relief
in equity. Accordingly, it rendered a judgment that the lease should
be cancelled as to the 320 acres on which no development had been
conducted "unless within a reasonable time an exploratory well
should be drilled therein to the Mississippi lime." The Mississippi
lime was the formation from which production was being obtained
from the two wells already drilled on the premises.
Other cases have held that where there has been a long delay in
development and the evidence shows that the lessee does not intend
to conduct any further development, the lessor is entitled to relief
3 Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934, 938 (1943).
a Texas Consol. Oils v. Vann, 208 Okla. 673, 258 P.2d 679 (1953).
40Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1952).
"1McKenna v. Nichols, 193 Okla. 526, 145 P.2d 957, 960 (1944).
4'292 U.S. 272 (1933), 93 A.L.R. 454 (1934).
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in equity. In such cases the usual finding is that the lessee is hold-
ing the lease not for development but for speculative purposes and
that such an attitude takes into consideration only the interest of
the lessee and not those of both the lessor and lessee. 3
c. The Test of Diligence Required.-The test of diligence re-
quired of the lessee is the "prudent operator" test, that is, whatever
under the circumstances would be reasonably expected of operators
of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor
and lessee. This is taken from the Brewster case and is familiarly
called the "prudent operator" rule. The rule has been quoted or
adopted in the courts of practically all the oil-producing states."
A Texas case defines the word "prudence" as follows: "The
Standard Dictionary ...gives as one of the meanings of the word
'prudence' good judgment and foresight in practical affairs; eco-
nomy; discretion; sagacity."" Also, under the definition and reason-
ing of the same case "what a person of ordinary prudence would
or would not do under the particular circumstances is the true test
of negligence."
Often, courts refer to the lessee's obligation under this covenant
as the duty to use reasonable diligence in conducting exploration and
development. This is no different from the "prudent operator" test.
"Reasonable diligence" means "the doing of that which an ex-
perienced operator of ordinary care and prudence would do in the
circumstances, having due regard for the interests of both lessor and
lessee.""'
43 Ezzell v. Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930); Banks v. Calstar
Petroleum Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 789, 187 P.2d 127 (1947); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Adams,
198 Ky. 283, 248 S.W. 841 (1923); Tome Land Grant v. Ringle Dev. Co., 56 N.M.
101, 240 P.2d 850 (1952); Coal Oil & Gas Co. v. Styron, -- Okla.-, 303 P.2d 965
(1956).
4E.g., Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d I (19th Cir. 1952); Hartman Ranch
Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); Jones v. Interstate
Oil Corp., 115 Cal. App. 302, 1 P.2d 1051 (1931); Doughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263
Il1. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914); Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 Ill. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519
(1950); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 153 Kan. 287, 110 P.2d 810 (1941); Greenwood v. Texas
Interstate Pipe Line Co., 143 Kan. 686, 56 P.2d 431 (1936); Warfield Natural Gas Co.
v. Allen, 248 Ky. 646, 59 S.W.2d 534 (1933), 91 A.L.R. 890 (1934); Swiss Oil Corp. v.
Risner, 223 Ky. 397, 3 S.W.2d 777 (1928); Hart v. Standard Oil Co., 146 La. 885, 84 So.
169 (1920); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684
(1914); Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P.2d 187 (1933); Libby v. De Baca,
51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263 (1947); Wilcox v. Ryndak, 174 Okla. 24, 49 P.2d 733 (1935);
Berton v. Coss, 139 Okla. 42, 280 Pac. 1093 (1929); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78
Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6
S.W.2d 1031 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 936 (1936); Senter v. Shanafelt, 233 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950); Bryan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 1 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
J. M. Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Jeff Chaison Townsite Co., 107 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908).
45 Houston & T. C. R.R. Co. v. Everett, 86 S.W. 17, 18 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 99 Tex. 269, 89 S.W. 76 (1905).
46Shell Petroleum Co. v. Shore, 72 F.2d 193, 194 (10th Cir. 1934); see Stanolind Oil
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It should be remembered that not every operator is a prudent
operator. There are times when operators of limited experience will
take a "flyer" and drill on acreage which has been rejected by ex-
perienced operators. In one instance an operator had a vivid dream
that a certain area would produce oil in paying quantities. It was
so real that he purchased a number of leases in that area and drilled
a well. He discovered there is merit to the old saw that "dreams
often go by contraries."
Another type of operator obtains his drilling information from the
man with the divining rod who takes his contraption over the surface
of land and confidently says that when it begins to "dip" oil will
be found under the spot where the "dip" occurs. A great deal of
money has been wasted in this country by those who believed that
oil and gas could be discovered in any such manner.
In the early days before the science of geology became such an
important factor in locating oil and gas deposits there were those
who believed in what was called "creekology." It was their belief
that oil and gas formations were more likely to be found along the
creeks and streams than elsewhere. Some of the "old-timers" still
entertain this opinion, but the prudent oil producer of today knows
that he must have all the information he can obtain about the under-
ground formations before he decides to drill. Accordingly, he seeks
all the geological and geophysical information he can get.
Another typical situation is where a man who has reaped large
profits in some other business and is in a high income tax bracket,
decides "to get his feet wet" in the oil business with "tax money."
He cannot lose much, so he takes a long chance. Without the benefit
of research, geological, and geophysical information the experienced
operator requires, he assembles a block of leases and drills a dry hole.
The prudent operator often drills dry holes too, but his prudence
causes him to get all the information possible before drilling a well,
and the records show conclusively that the practice of "prudence"
results in success more often than would be the case without it.
These illustrations are mentioned in order to show that an operator
may not be a "prudent operator" merely because he is willing to
drill a well on a particular lease. A case somewhat in point is that
of Romero v. Humble Oil FJ Ref. Co." There the plaintiff sought
to cancel Humble's lease for failure to develop. Humble had drilled
& Gas Co. v. Sellers, 174 F.2d 948, 951 (10th Cir. 1949); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,
140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905); Jacob v. Stephenson, 254 S.W. 1117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923)
error dism.
4793 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. La. 1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952).
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three wells on the leased property, but when a demand was made by
the landowner for a fourth well, it refused to drill further, taking
the position that the leasehold was sufficiently developed and that
no prudent operator would drill an additional well. It was further
shown that Humble and its associate had spent approximately half
a million dollars in developing the property and Humble's geological
witnesses presented extensive data and studies to show that it would
not be prudent to drill another well on the lease. The plaintiff pre-
sented one geologist, Courtney, who recommended that another well
be drilled. As to the qualifications of the geological witnesses the
court said:
Defendant and intervenor rely on the testimony of three geologists, all
of whom maintain that Courtney has incorrectly interpreted the geo-
logical data on the Romero tract and that his correlation of the logs
of the wells on the Romero and Germany tracts is in error. It also
appears that at least one of the intervenor's geologists has had years
of experience with the Little Bayou field, whereas Courtney admitted-
ly devoted but three weeks to his study of the oil and gas potential
under the Romero property. . . .If the decision in this case were to
rest solely on the opinion of geologists there is little question but that
the defendant and intervenor would prevail. . . . In spite of the in-
sistence by defendants and intervenor's geologists that no reason-
ably prudent operator would drill additional wells on the Romero
property, the bald fact remains that plaintiff has an experienced opera-
tor who is willing, ready and able to drill his land, and the oil com-
panies, while refusing to drill, are fighting desperately to maintain
their lease." (Emphasis added.)
Thus the court rejected all the geological evidence of defendant
and intervenor, all of which is admittedly reliable and would have
prevailed over the geological evidence of plaintiff, and based its deci-
sion on the "bald fact" that there was an operator willing to drill
another well on the premises. There was no evidence to show
whether that operator was prudent or imprudent other than the
geological testimony, and that established the fact that a prudent
operator would not drill another well. Apparently, the court took
the position that any operator who would drill would fulfill all the
requirements of a prudent operator. The court's reasoning is con-
trary to all the settled law on the subject.
The appellate court found that the decision of the trial court was
based "not upon a preponderance of competent geological opinion
that a theoretical reasonably prudent operator would drill an addi-
tional well or wells, but entirely upon the assurance of Rebstock that
" Id. at 119, 120.
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if he could obtain the property free of defendant's lease he would
drill as recommended by Courtney. . . ."" (Emphasis added.)
A review of the opinions of both courts in this case reveals the
fact that there was no competent testimony to show that a reason-
ably prudent operator would drill another well on this property. The
issue was not "would Rebstock drill" but "would a reasonably pru-
dent operator drill"? It would appear that the principal question, the
prudent operator test, was completely sidetracked by the courts.
The reasoning in the Romero case has not been followed by state
courts. It was specifically rejected in a Texas case," and treated only
as cumulative evidence in the Oklahoma case of Knight v. Herndon
Drilling Co.," and in the Louisiana case of Carter v. Arkansas Loui-
siana Gas Co.2 In substance, the Romero doctrine has also been re-
jected generally by many other courts in the enumeration of the
factors and circumstances that must be considered in determining
whether further drilling should be conducted under this implied cov-
enant. If these factors are to be given effect as prescribed by the
courts, they eliminate the theory that the lessee is required to drill
if only the plaintiff can produce a witness who will testify that he
would drill if he could obtain the lease. These factors are discussed
in the succeeding paragraphs.
2. "The Reasonable Diligence" Required of the Lessee Is Subject to a
Variety of Facts and Circumstances
The first case to enumerate some of the factors which affect the
lessee's obligation to conduct further drilling under the "prudent
operator" or "reasonable diligence" test was the Brewster case." The
expressions of this case have been adopted generally and additional
factors have been enumerated in some jurisdictions.
Based on the Brewster case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has
commented in a leading case as follows:
The courts have made no distinction in the application of this test to
covenants to drill additional wells and covenants to protect against
"'Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1952).
"°Clifton v. Koontz, 305 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error granted on an-
other point.
"-Okla.-, 296 P.2d 158, 163-64 (1955).
5213 La. 1028, 36 So. 2d 26 (1948).
"Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). The court there said:
Whether or not in any particular instance such diligence is exercised depends upon a
variety of circumstances, such as the quantity of oil and gas capable of being produced
from the premises, as indicated by prior exploration and development, the local market
or demand therefor or the means of transporting them to market, the extent and results
of the operations, if any, on adjacent lands, the character of the natural reservoir-




drainage .... But in each instance, depending on the particular cir-
cumstances, many factors must be considered, including: (1) Location
of lease premises-whether in wildcat territory, or producing field,
(2) probable quantity of oil and gas capable of being produced from
the lease premises as indicated by the prior development, (3) market
conditions and transportation facilities, (4) the extent and result of
operation on adjacent lands, (5) the extent of the area which is
normally drained by a well in that field, (6) the character and extent
of the subsurface structure and sand in that area, (7) the expense
necessary to secure production and operate producing wells for pro-
tection against drainage, (8) whether the well to be offset is produc-
ing oil or gas in paying quantities, (9) usage of the business, and cost
of drilling, producing, and marketing."
A recent Texas case found that the plaintiff had failed to make a
case based on breach of this covenant, assigning the following rea-
sons:
The lessee is not required to continue in performance of the implied
obligations unless continuance will be profitable, not only to his lessor,
but also to him. . . . We find there is insufficient evidence to support
a judgment for appellees because it is not shown by competent evi-
dence (1) that the lease as a whole was not reasonably developed; (2)
that if additional wells would be drilled on said 40 acres that same
would probably result in the production of oil or gas in paying quan-
tities; (3) the evidence is insufficient to show damage by drainage
from offset wells; (4) the evidence is insufficient to establish that ap-
pellant had abandoned the lease or any part thereof; (5) the only evi-
dence in the record is to the effect that no wells have been drilled
on said 40 acres, which alone will not support a cause of action for
cancellation; (6) the evidence is insufficient to establish that an
ordinary prudent person in the oil business would under the same or
similar circumstances drill a well on said 40 acres; and (7) extent of
our State spacing rules covering said field is not in the record.5"
A Kansas case cited the factors named in the Brewster case and
then added another, it being the same as the last element cited in
the Senter case. The court emphasized this element as follows:
One of these economic facts was the current limitation of production,
under state order. Such restrictions upon production, under lawful
orders of either federal or state authority are certainly pertinent fac-
tors to be considered along with other economic factors, on an issue
of prudent development."
"Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427, 430 (1938).
"Senter v. Shanafelt, 233 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
"Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95, 101 (1943). Other
cases defining the factors and outlining the circumstances to be considered on the issue of
the prudent development obligation are: Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149
F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimmel, 68 F.2d 520 (10th Cir.
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An examination of the foregoing factors reveals that they deal
mostly with underground conditions, such as the productivity of the
formation underlying the lease in question and other properties in
the vicinity, the extent of the "subterranean oil reservoir," the char-
acter and extent of the subsurface structure and sand in that area,
etc., as establishing whether or not the additional well would be re-
quired under the "reasonable diligence" or "prudent operator" test.
Consequently, most of the evidence offered in a case where this cov-
enant is invoked is "expert" testimony, such as the opinions of
geologists, geophysicists, petroleum engineers, and experienced opera-
tors acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. Professor Summers says:
But the ultimate issue, that is, whether the lessee has exercised reason-
able diligence in development and protection of the land, must be
decided by reaching a conclusion from all the facts presented. It is
within the province of the court or jury to make this conclusion, but
the opinions of those skilled in such matters are of great value to the
court or jury. Consequently, it is common practice to permit petro-
leum geologists, engineers and practical oil operators, properly qualified,
to express opinions as to whether, under the evidence presented, a
reasonably prudent operator with knowledge of such facts, would or
would not have drilled additional or protection wells with a reasonable
expectation of profit to himself from the venture. 7 (Emphasis added.)
It is recognized that the extent or productivity of underground
formations cannot be determined with certainty unless there is actual
drilling. So, if the operator is to be obligated to drill into a section
of the producing area not theretofore explored on the basis of
opinion evidence, that evidence should be the best obtainable under
the circumstances.
As said in the case of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimmel:
The oil industry is not an exact science, and whether or not in a par-
ticular situation additional wells should be drilled, or what results
would follow if drilled, is at best a matter of opinion. So we are
relegated to, and must rely to some extent, at least, upon the judgment
of experienced and practical operators and qualified geological experts
alike; and where the evidence produced is the best available, relief can-
not be denied simply because it is not as exact as a court might wish
1934); Watchorn v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 5 F.2d 636, 647 (8th Cir. 1925); Becker
v. Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 Pac. 245 (1922); Wadkins v. Wilson Oil
Corp., 199 La. 656, 6 So. 2d 720 (1942); Robinson v. Miracle, 146 Okla. 31, 293 Pac.
211 (1930); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920); Texas
Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex. 418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 936
(1929).
572 Summers, Oil & Gas § 414, at 379 (2d ed. 1952).
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for. Parties to contracts of this nature are charged with knowledge of
their uncertainties and speculative character."s
The importance of expert testimony in these cases is reflected by
an examination of the many cases in which the covenant has been
invoked?9
B. When the Implied Covenant Is Not Applicable
If there are express covenants in a lease specifying the extent of
further development, there is no implied covenant of development.
This principle was expressly considered in the Brewster case, based
on the fact that the lease gave the lessee two years to drill a well,
with provision that upon payment of an annual rental of seventy-
eight dollars the time for drilling might be extended from the ex-
piration of the second year until the well should be drilled and
with the further provision that the well must be drilled within the
period of five years from the date of the lease or the lease should
terminate. Commenting upon these provisions, the court said that
"the measure of diligence which the lessee was required to exer-
cise in prosecuting the work of exploration and development during
the first five years was expressly and definitely prescribed, and was
not left to any implication which otherwise might arise from the
nature of the lease or from the other stipulations therein.""0 This
rule has been followed by the courts generally.61
" 68 F.2d 520, 522 (10th Cir. 1934).
59 E.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Sellers, 174 F.2d 948, 954 (10th Cir. 1950); Blair
v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921), 19 A.L.R. 430
(1922); Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039 (1958); Compton
v. Fisher-McCall, Inc., 298 Mich. 648, 299 N.W. 750 (1941); Empire Gas & Fuel Co.
v. Haggard, 152 Okla. 35, 3 P.2d 675 (1931); State Line Oil & Gas Co. v. Thomas,
35 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Lido Oil Co. v. W. T. Waggoner
Estate, 31 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref. The case of Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Remero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952), affirming Romero v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. La. 1950), appears to furnish an exception to the rule that
the obligation to conduct additional drilling is based on all the facts and circumstances of
the case. There, the geological testimony was "preponderant" in favor of the lessee, as the
court said, but the case was decided against the lessee because of the "bald fact" that one
witness testified that he would drill a well on the property if he could obtain a lease.60Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 808 (8th Cir. 1905).
61 Simpson v. Adkins, 386 Ill. 64, 53 N.E.2d 979 (1944); Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co.,
263 II1. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914); Poe v. Wrey, 233 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 46 (1908);
Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263 (1951); Rolander v.
Sanderson, 141 Kan. 809, 43 P.2d 1061 (1935); Skinner v. Ajax Portland Cement Co.,
109 Kan. 72, 197 Pac. 875 (1921); Mills v. Hartz, 77 Kan. 218, 94 Pac. 142 (1908);
Ringle v. Quigg, 74 Kan. 581, 87 Pac. 724 (1906); Rose v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 68 Kan.
126, 74 Pac. 625 (1903); Sabatier v. Canal Oil Co., 202 La. 639, 12 So. 2d 665 (1942);
Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924); Prince v. Standard Oil Co., 147 La.
283, 84 So. 657 (1920); Nabors v. Producers Oil Co., 140 La. 985, 74 So. 527 (1917);
Cochran v. Gulf Ref. Co., 139 La. 1010, 72 So. 718 (1916); McClendon v. Busch-Everett
Co., 138 La. 722, 70 So. 781 (1916); Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers Oil Co., 134
La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914); State ex rel Commissioners v. Couch, -Okla.-, 298 P.2d
452 (1956); Berton v. Coss, 139 Okla. 42, 280 Pac. 1093 (1929); McKee v. Thornton,
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C. Scope of the Covenant-Additional Development in
Producing Sands and Deeper Formations
Often there is more than one producing formation in a general
area. Where there are deeper untested formations underlying a lease
that is producing from an upper sand, is the lessee under an ob-
ligation to drill and develop the lower sands?
Of course, if there is production on an adjacent property near
enough to drain oil from under the lease, the so-called drainage
covenant would apply. This covenant, often called "the implied
covenant to protect the leased premises against drainage," would re-
quire the lessee to drill a "protection" well or wells, provided
(1) there is no express covenant defining the duty of the lessee in
such cases, and (2) it is shown that such a well would be sufficiently
productive to pay the lessee a profit over and above operating costs.15
Ordinarily, the drainage covenant is sufficient to protect both
the lessor and lessee and to provide the "reasonable diligence" nec-
essary therefor. However, there have been cases where the lessor
has demanded drilling to the lower sands where the wells on other
lands are located at such distance as to make the drainage covenant
inoperative. In many of the cases where this issue has been raised,
the lessor has demanded further development both in the forma-
tion from which production is being obtained and the deeper un-
explored formation. The courts have applied the "prudent opera-
tor" test to both situations. Of course, the degree of proof will vary
in each case. What would be sufficient evidence to require a lessee
to develop further a formation already producing on his lease would
ordinarily not be enough to require him to drill deeper where the
deeper production was some distance from his lease. But the prin-
ciple is the same; whatever in the circumstances would be reason-
ably expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to
the interests of both lessor and lessee, is what is required.
79 Okla. 138, 192 Pac. 212 (1920); Eastern Oil Co. v. Beatty, 71 Okla. 275, 177 P. 104
(1918); Southwestern Oil Co. v. McDaniel, 71 Okla. 142, 175 Pat. 920 (1918); Simms
Oil Co. v. Flewellen, 138 Tex. 63, 156 S.W.2d 521 (1942); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 129
Tex. 487, 103 S.W.2d 965 (1937); Warren v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 211 S.W.2d 314
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Strauss, 243 S.W. 528 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922); Burt v. Deorsam, 227 S.W. 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
62 Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1931); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Asso-
ciated Oil Co., 10 Cal. 2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937); Myers v. Shell Petroleum Co., 153
Kan. 287, 110 P.2d 811 (1941); Ramsey Petroleum Co. v. Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d
427 (1938); Franklin v. Wigton, 132 Okla. 236, 270 Pac. 1 (1928); States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 161 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.; Magnolia Petro-
leum Co. v. Page, 141 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.; State Line Oil &
Gas Co. v. Thomas, 35 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.; Steele v. American
Oil Dev. Co., 80 W. Va. 206, 92 S.E. 410 (1917).
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Many cases have applied the prudent operator test to the lessee's
obligation to drill to deeper sands which might exist beneath pro-
ducing sands. In each case the rule has been announced that such
an obligation depends upon whether there is a reasonable expectancy
of profit in such operations. These cases hold also that the "hazards
and costs" of that character of development should be considered
in determining whether the duty to drill exists in any particular
case.63
Several noted writers have analyzed the cases and expressed their
opinions on the obligation of the lessee to drill deeper and untested
formations on a producing lease. Professor Maurice Merrill says:
"There is an obligation to attempt to develop production from lower
strata where the data available gives reasonable ground for believing
that they may contain profitable deposits." Expressing it in different
words he refers to the "obligation to exploit deeper sands if reason-
able ground for expecting profitable production exists.""
Professor A. W. Walker also discusses the "deeper drilling" ob-
ligation, saying: "It would seem that this implied duty would not
exist unless there were wells in the vicinity producing in paying
quantities from the lower stratum and unless the known geological
formations were such as would lead a reasonably prudent operator
to believe that the possibility that this lower producing horizon
" Typical of the reasoning in these cases is that in Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard,
269 S.W. 482, 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error dism., as follows:
The implied obligation on the part of a lessee, under a contract like the one under
consideration, is to exercise good faith and sound discretion to drill to a depth that is
reasonably necessary to test the land. The lessee is not required to peer down into the
soil with an X-ray vision and determine whether at any depth there can be found oil
or gas, but merely to exercise good faith and sound discretion as to whether oil or gas
may be found. We think the evidence fully supports the trial court's finding to the
effect that the lessee in this case exercised good faith and discretion in its conclusion that
it would not be profitable to drill deeper the two wells sunk on the Stuard lease, or
to sink another well on it, and that such is all that a lessee is required to do.
See also Sparks v. Midstates Oil Corp., 251 F.2d 71 (10th Cir. 1958); Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1954); Berryman v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 164
F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1948); Carter Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 100 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1939);
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (sth Cir. 1905); Clayton v. Atlantic Ref. Co.,
150 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.N.M. 1957); Wood v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 40 F. Supp. 42
(W.D. Ark. 1941); Salsberry v. Siegel, 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834 (1952); Becker
v. Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 Pac. 245 (1921); Tamsk v. Continental Oil
Co., 158 Kan. 747, 150 P.2d 326 (1944); Myers v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 153 Kan. 287,
110 P.2d 810 (1941); Carter v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So. 2d
26 (1948); Coyle v. North American Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942); Texas
Consol. Oils v. Vann, 208 Okla. 673, 258 P.2d 679 (1953); Ramsey Petroleum Co. v.
Davis, 184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1939); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla.
39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920); Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. McLean, 245 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.; Allen v. Colonial Oil Co., 92 W. Va. 689, 115
S.E. 842 (1923); 31A Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas § 136 (1947).
O'Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 174 (2d ed. 1940).
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underlay the leased premises justified the drilling of a test well.""
Professor Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr., in discussing the covenant
to drill additional wells after production, says: "It seems that in no
case has this obligation been restricted to drilling to the stratum
to which the prior well or wells were drilled . . . . The correct test,
it is believed, is not what public policy dictates, but what the pro-
visions of the lease are and what covenants can be reasonably im-
plied therefrom. Usually this would result in application of the
reasonable and prudent operator test. ' "
Professor C. J. Meyers, however, has proposed a new covenant to
apply to deeper drilling on a lease already producing. He would re-
quire a lessee to "explore" deeper formations if production from
deeper sands is discovered in the general area of the leased premises.
His illustrative case was that of a rancher whose lessee has drilled
three producing wells on the leased premises and later a deeper pro-
ducing sand is discovered two miles from the lease. Under this latter
view, such a covenant would impose upon the lessee, where the
rancher demanded it, the obligation to "explore" the deeper forma-
tion on the rancher's land without considering the prudent operator
rule and whether there is any reasonable expectation of profit from
such drilling or not."
This writer has taken issue with Professor Meyers, both as to the
"reasonableness" of his proposed covenant, and also as to the appli-
cability of the authorities cited in support of it. These differences
are revealed in a recent book68 and in subsequent law review articles."
It is this writer's position that the proposed new covenant is un-
necessary; that the "prudent operator" test fully protects the lessor
in such case; and that there is no difference in principle in applying
this test to development of known producing sands and to deeper
sands to which no wells have been drilled on a particular lease.
D. Applicability of the Covenant During
the Primary Term of Lease
In most of the cases reported the implied covenant has been in-
voked following the expiration of the primary term of the lease and
during the period thereafter when the lease is continued by produc-
65 Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 11 Texas L. Rev. 399, 425 (1933).
666 Oil & Gas Rep. 1099 (1956).
"
7 Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 Texas L. Rev. 553 (1956).
6'Brown, The Law of Oil and Gas Leases (1958).
69 Brown, The Proposed New Covenant of Further Exploration: Reply to Comment, 37
Texas L. Rev. - (1959); Meyers, The Covenant of Further Exploration: A Comment,
37 Texas L. Rev. 179 (1958).
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tion. However, in the recent Kansas case of Berry v. Wondra7 the
lease was for a term of five years from June 4, 1947, and as long
thereafter as oil or gas was produced from the land by the lessee.
An oil-producing well was completed on October 7, 1947, and there-
after a dry hole was completed on March 22, 1948. The suit appears
to have been filed in May 1951, and was tried in August 1951, at
which time the well was producing seven barrels of oil per day. The
Kansas Supreme Court reviewed its former decisions, none of which
was in point, on applying the covenant during the primary term,
and, reversing the trial court, reached the decision:
When the lessee of an oil and gas lease undertakes to develop the leased
premises the implied covenant to fully develop the leased premises with
reasonable diligence applies during the primary term of the lease as
effectively as when the term of the lease is extended by production
within the primary term.7 (Syllabus by the court)
The court directed an alternative decree providing that the lease
should be cancelled as to all but the ten acres on which the produc-
ing well was located unless the lessee within a specified time should
commence the drilling of another well and complete it as soon as
reasonably possible, and thereafter develop the lease in good faith
as a prudent operator should do.
In an early Oklahoma case the court announced the same rule,'
holding that the implied covenants in an oil and gas lease for further
exploration and development after discovery of oil or gas are op-
erative within the fixed term as well as when the lease is held there-
after under the production clause.'
70 173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282 (1952).
71 Id., 246 P.2d at 283. A strong dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Wedell,
246 P.2d at 293. He based his dissent both on an analysis of the lease provisions and
general equitable considerations. Among other things he said, 246 P.2d at 296:
I also pause to observe plaintiff's declared right to cancellation during the primary
term, in my opinion, is contrary to the common operative interpretation of leases of
this character by both lessors and lessees over a long period of years. The decision renders
literally hundreds of oil and gas leases so interpreted and operated subject to cancellation.
This, as previously stated, is an important decision. It purports to be based on an
equitable doctrine that a landowner is entitled to have the lease reasonably developed
during the primary term, if the lease owner undertakes to drill and obtains one produc-
ing oil well during such term, instead of paying rentals. The right to cancellation is de-
clared to be equitable notwithstanding the fact the producing well provides a much
more substantial return to the landowner than payment of annual rentals. In other
words, the decision means the lease owner, in equity, is to be penalized for having pro-
vided a much greater return to the landowner out of production during the primary
term than the parties agreed the landowner was entitled to demand. . . . The decision
that plaintiff was entitled to cancellation during the primary term is the most staggering
blow that could be dealt to the small independent oil and gas lease operators in this
state. I likewise have no doubt experience will prove the decision will not, over the long
run, inure to the benefit but will result in substantial loss to landowners generally. Its
effect is to reduce competition in the development of leases.
"Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1926).
"'See also Mercer v. American Oil & Ref. Co., 173 Okla. 515, 49 P.2d 101 (1935).
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E. Remedies for Breach of the Covenant
Although the implied covenant for additional drilling or develop-
ment is, in substance, uniformly construed in practically all the oil
and gas producing states, there is considerable variance as to the
remedy for breach of the covenant. In most of the states the remedy
by action for damages is either exclusive or preferred. In others, the
principal remedy is by cancellation of the lease in whole or in part.
Some states that recognize cancellation also give relief by way of
damages in a proper case.
In Texas, some of the earlier cases announced the rule that can-
cellation was a proper remedy.74 Then came the landmark case of
Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co.7" There the Supreme Court held:
"The usual remedy for breach of the lessee's implied covenant for
reasonable development of oil and gas is an action for damages,
though, under extraordinary circumstances-where there can be no
other adequate relief-a court of equity will entertain an action to
cancel the lease in whole or in part."7 Practically speaking, this case
has established the recovery of damages as the remedy for breach of
this covenant, and the rule has been reaffirmed in subsequent deci-
sions.7
The rule in Kansas is very similar to the Texas rule. In Christensen
v. Virginia Drilling Co.7" the court said: "Instances are rare where
equity will enforce a forfeiture for breach of an implied covenant;
The Booker case was decided principally on the basis of "abandonment," the court saying
"lessees have barely escaped abandonment." The court further said that the "rule that
there must be a relinquishment as well as an intent to abandon . . .has no application to
abandonment of the intangible rights created by an oil and gas lease where the lessee ac-
quires no title to the mineral. . . .The lessee may abandon the objects and purposes of part
of a lease although he may be producing oil or gas from the remainder." This holding in the
Booker case was overruled in the later case of Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla.
359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943), where the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reviewed its former de-
cisions on abandonment and overruled many of them, specifically naming Fox Petroleum Co.
v. Booker, saying: "We leave the doctrine of abandonment to be applied in cases where in-
tention to abandon is accompanied by physical relinquishment." (Emphasis added.)
74 Cox v. Sinclair Gulf Oil Co., 265 S.W. 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) error ref.;
Guffey Petroleum Co. v. Oliver, 79 S.W. 884 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) error ref.
" 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929).
7 Id. at 518, 19 S.W.2d at 29.
7 Henshaw v. Texas Natural Resources Foundation, 147 Tex. 436, 216 S.W.2d 566
(1949); Ryan v. Kent, 36 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); Hines v. Hanover
Co., 23 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930); Spurlock v. Hinton, 225 S.W.2d 203
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Gay v. Brinnan, 218 S.W.2d 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error
ref. n.r.e.; General Crude Oil Co. v. Harris, 101 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)
error dism.; Ralph v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 95 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
error ref.; Gibson v. Sheldon, 90 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error ref.; Union
Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error
ref.; Johnson v. Montgomery, 31 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.; Rendle-
man v. Bartlett, 21 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error ref.
71 170 Kan. 355, 226 P.2d 263 (1951).
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it will never do so where less drastic redress will satisfy the demands
of justice, and forfeitures of oil and gas leases for breach of implied
covenants are seldom decreed and never arbitrarily."79 However,
since the Christensen decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas has
handed down two decisions"0 in which decrees of cancellation were
entered if the respective lessees failed to commence additional dril-
ling within a specified time. The Christensen case was not over-
ruled; it is presumed the court found that no remedy other than
cancellation would "satisfy the demands of justice."
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma early recognized forfeiture of
a lease as a remedy for breaching implied covenants of development.
One of the first cases was Indiana Oil, Gas & Dev. Co. v. Mc-
Crory"' where the court said: "A court of equity will decree a
forfeiture of an oil and gas lease on account of a breach of an
implied covenant to diligently operate and develop the property
when such forfeiture will effectuate justice." That rule has been
followed consistently in Oklahoma since its first announcement. 2
There may be partial cancellation or cancellation only of the un-
developed portion of a lease when the facts and circumstances justify
that action. 3 Also, a lessor in a proper case, such as an action for
breach of implied covenant to protect against drainage, may have
his remedy in damages.9 "
The remedy of forfeiture has also been applied and enforced in
Louisiana, 5 Kentucky, " Arkansas, 7 and New Mexico, 9 but repudi-
7 Id., 226 P.2d at 268.
"°Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039 (1958); Berry v.
Wondra, 173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282 (1952).
"'42 Okla. 136, 140 Pac. 610 (1914).
"
2Morrison v. Johnson, 199 Okla. 264, 185 P.2d 208 (1947); Doss Oil Royalty Co.
v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943); Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis,
184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427 (1938); Berton v. Coss, 139 Okla. 42, 280 Pac. 1093 (1929);
Scott v. Price, 123 Okla. 172, 247 Pac. 103 (1926); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North,
78 Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920).
S Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla. 289, 228 P.2d 1000 (1950); Donaldson v. Josey Oil Co.,
106 Okla. 11, 232 Pac. 821 (1924); Papoose Oil Co. v. Rainey, 89 Okla. 110, 213 Pac.
882 (1923); Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 Pac. 1069 (1920).
" Junction Oil & Gas Co. v. Pratt, 99 Okla. 14, 225 Pac. 717 (1924); Blackwell Oil
& Gas Co. v. Whitesides, 71 Okla. 41, 174 Pac. 573 (1918).
" Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Romero, 194 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1952); Carter v.
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So. 2d 26 (1948); Prince v. Standard Oil
Co., 147 La. 283, 84 So. 657 (1920).
S Warnen Oil & Gas Co. v. Gilliam, 182 Ky. 807, 207 S.W. 698 (1919); Dinsmoor
v. Combs, 177 Ky. 740, 198 S.W. 58 (1917); Monarch Oil, Gas & Coal Co. v. Richard-
son, 124 Ky. 602, 99 S.W. 668 (1907). The remedy of damages has also been recognized
in Kentucky, Webb v. Goof, 298 Ky. 644, 159 S.W.2d 433 (1942).
" Nolan v. Thomas, -Ark.-, 309 S.W.2d 727 (1958); Smart v. Crow, 220 Ark.
141, 246 S.W.2d 432 (1952); Standard Oil Co. v. Giller, 183 Ark. 776, 38 S.W.2d 766
(1931); Ezzell v. Oil Associates, 180 Ark. 802, 22 S.W.2d 1015 (1930). Also, the remedy
by way of damages has been applied in Arkansas. Ezzell v. Oil Associates, supra; Blair v.
Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co., 148 Ark. 301, 230 S.W. 286 (1921), 19 A.L.R. 430 (1922).
SSClayton v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 150 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.N.M. 1957); Libby v. De Baca,
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ated in Illinois,9 Ohio," 'West Virginia,"1 California, 2 and Indiana. 3
In Pennsylvania the courts have not clearly announced the rule
as to forfeiture for breach of implied covenants. There are a number
of cases, however, in which forfeiture has been decreed on the ground
of abandonment."4 In a very late case" the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania uses language which would appear to limit the remedy of
cancellation to cases in which there has been abandonment by the
lessee.
Thus it appears from the decisions of the thirteen oil and gas pro-
ducing states mentioned above that (1) six reject forfeiture as a
remedy for breach of implied covenants, limiting such remedy to
violation of expressed covenants, (2) five recognize and apply the
remedy of forfeiture to breaches of implied covenants, and (3)
two - Texas and Kansas - make an action at law the preferred
remedy and will not enforce forfeiture unless there can be no other
adequate relief.
1. Procedure
There are some substantial variations in the procedure for en-
forcing the remedy among different jurisdictions. In Oklahoma, for
example, and most other states, a suit to establish a breach of implied
covenants is an equitable action and is triable to the court without
a jury. In Texas, where all cases with disputed fact questions,
whether legal or equitable, are triable to a jury, the implied covenant
cases are almost always submitted to a jury for a determination of
the fact questions. In Louisiana, where in all cases a verdict of the
jury is only advisory, practically all implied covenant actions are
tried to the court as are other cases.
a. Notice and Demand to Develop.-It is the general rule that as a
prerequisite to the bringing of an action based on breach of implied
covenants the plaintiff-lessor must serve his lessee with a notice
specifying the manner in which the lessee has not complied with his
development covenants and allowing a reasonable time thereafter for
the lessee to comply."
51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263 (1947); State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Co. v. Worden, 44 N.M.
400, 103 P.2d 124 (1940).
S9Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 10i5 N.E. 308 (1914).
9°Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
"'McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 135 S.E. 238, 241 (1926).
9295 Cal. App. 2d 402, 212 P.2d 927, 933 (1949).
933 3 Ind. App. 1, 70 N.E. 552 (1904).
"4Clark v. Wright, 311 Pa. 69, 166 Atl. 775 (1933); Marshall v. Forest Oil Co.,
198 Pa. 83, 47 Ati. 927 (1901); Aye v. Philadelphia Co., 193 Pa. 451, 44 Atl. 555 (1899);
Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atl. 732 (1893).
" Girolami v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 365 Pa. 455, 76 A.2d 375 (1950).
"Metzler & Co. v. Stevenson, 217 Cal. 236, 18 P.2d 330 (1933); Jameson v. Chans-
1959]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
b. Burden of Proof.-In actions based upon alleged breach of im-
plied covenants it is the uniform rule that the burden of proof is
upon the lessor to establish such breach by a preponderance of the
evidence."7
In Oklahoma this rule has been modified. Beginning with the case
of Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co.," the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa has held in several cases that where there has been an "un-
reasonable delay" in drilling additional wells, after discovery of oil
and gas in paying quantities, a prima facie case can be made by the
lessor by showing a failure to continue development for an "un-
reasonable length of time." What would be an unreasonable length
of time or the nature of the proof that would be required to estab-
lish such unreasonableness is not detailed by the court. It simply said
in the Doss case: "What may be an unreasonable length of time must
necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case." However,
the court did throw some light upon this issue by its statements con-
cerning the doctrine of abandonment. Overturning a former de-
cisions9 the court said in the Doss case: "In Oklahoma we have
granted relief under similar fact situations and called the theory
abandonment. . . . [W]e leave the doctrine of abandonment to be
applied in cases where intention to abandon is accompanied by phys-
ical relinquishment..... It seems reasonable to infer that the "un-
reasonable length of time" which would now enable a lessor to make
lor-Canfield Midway Oil Co., 176 Cal. 1, 167 Pac. 369 (1917); Indiana Natural Gas &
Oil Co. v. Beales, 166 Ind. 684, 76 N.E. 520 (1906); Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Littler,
162 Ind. 320, 70 N.E. 363 (1904); Cowman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762,
51 P.2d 988 (1935); Towell v. Fluharty, 110 Kan. 260, 203 Pac. 703 (1922); Lawrence
Oil Corp. v. Metcalfe, 266 Ky. 819, 100 S.W.2d 217 (1936); Dinsmoor v. Combs, 177
Ky. 740, 198 S.W. 58 (1917); Temple v. Lindsay, 182 La. 22, 161 So. 8 (1935); Pipes
v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Champlin, 163 Okla. 226,
22 P.2d 102 (1933); Utilities Prod. Corp. v. Riddle, 161 Okla. 99, 16 P.2d 1092 (1932);
Wapa Oil & Dev. Co. v. McBride, 84 Okla. 184, 201 Pac. 784 (1921); Hoover v. Gen-
eral Crude Oil Co., 147 Tex. 89, 212 S.W.2d 140 (1948); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Cruse, 271
S.W. 886 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89
S.E.2d 12 (1916).
7 Gerson v. Anderson-Prichard Prod. Corp., 149 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1945); Goodwin
v. Standard Oil Co., 290 Fed. 92 (8th Cir. 1923); Miller v. Union Gas & Oil Co., 295
Fed. 27 (6th Cir. 1924); Saulsberry v. Siegel, 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834 (1952);
Becker v. Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 Pac. 245 (1922); Fischer v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 722, 137 P.2d 139, affirming 156 Kan. 367, 133 P.2d 95 (1943);
Lawrence Oil Corp. v. Metcalfe, 241 Ky. 353, 43 S.W.2d 986 (1931); Coyle v.
North American Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942); Consolidated Gas
Co. v. Rieckhoff, 116 Mont. 1, 151 P.2d 588 (1944); Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis,
184 Okla. 155, 85 P.2d 427, 430 (1938); Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 117 Tex.
418, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (1928), 60 A.L.R. 936 (1929); Corsicana Petroleum Co. v. Owens,
110 Tex. 568, 222 S.W. 154 (1920); Cowden v. General Crude Oil Co., 217 S.W.2d
109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Allen v. Colonial Oil Co., 92 W. Va. 689,
115 S.E. 842 (1923).
08192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934 (1943).
99 Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1926).
1°°Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 192 Okla. 359, 137 P.2d 934, 937-38 (1943).
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out a prima facie case without anything further would be such as the
court in former cases has held to justify abandonment.''
2. Alternative Decree
In applying equitable principles and in pursuance of their broad
equitable powers, courts of equity generally follow the practice of
rendering an "alternative" decree where cancellation is sought for
breach of implied covenants and the plaintiff proves his case. Under
such a decree, if the court decides there has been a breach of an im-
plied covenant, it will specify the particulars which constitute the
breach, what the lessee must do to remedy it, and then give the lessee
a reasonable time to comply with the directions of the court. Failure
to comply as directed will result in making the decree absolute.' 2
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the many decisions involving implied cove-
nants of development or additional drilling reveals the difficulty
courts have in applying fixed principles to varying fact situations.
No two cases present the same facts. The standard of "reasonable-
ness" is applied both to the lessor's demands and the lessee's duty.
And, what is reasonable in one case may not be reasonable in another.
For example, a delay of seven years was held in one case' °  not to be
unreasonable in developing both known and untested sands under a
lease. In another case"0 4 where a well drilled produced some oil but
was completed as a dry hole and there was evidence that the "hydro-
frac method," unknown when the so-called dry hole was completed,
would have changed the "dry hole" into a paying well, the court
ordered the lessee to drill another well after a lapse of some three or
four years from the completion of the dry hole. In the same case the
court said: "No hard or fast rule can be laid down as to what con-
'°'Neff v. Jones, -- Okla.-, 288 P.2d 712 (1955); Texas Consol. Oils v. Vann, 208
Okla. 673, 258 P.2d 679 (1953); Colpitt v. Tull, 204 Okla. 289, 228 P.2d 1000 (1950);
McKenna v. Nichols, 193 Okla. 526, 145 P.2d 957 (1944).
102 Representative cases on this point are: Sunder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,
292 U.S. 272 (1934), 93 A.L.R. 454; Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1 (10th
Cir. 1952); Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Doering, 93 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1937), 114
A.L.R. 1385; Smart v. Crow, 220 Ark. 141, 246 S.W.2d 432 (1952); Poindextor v. Lion
Oil Co., 205 Ark. 978, 167 S.W.2d 492 (1943); Storm v. Barbara Oil Co., 177 Kan. 589,
282 P.2d 417 (1955); Berry v. Wondra, 173 Kan. 273, 246 P.2d 282 (1952); Cowman v.
Phillips Petroleum Corp., 142 Kan. 762, 51 P.2d 988 (1935); Webb v. Croft, 120 Kan. 654,
244 Pac. 1033 (1926); Libby v. De Baca, 51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263 (1947); Chapman
v. Bowers, 180 Okla. 49, 67 P.2d 788 (1937); Wing v. Edwards, 175 Okla. 642, 54 P.2d
351 (1936); Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Whitesides, 71 Okla. 41, 174 Pac. 573 (1918);
Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27, 32 (1929).
..a Texas Consol. Oils v. Vann., 208 Okla. 673, 258 P.2d 679 (1953).
'"Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952).
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stitutes an unreasonable delay. Ten years may not be unreasonable in
one case, while five years may be unreasonable in another. 1..
The "reasonableness" depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. Many of these factors have been set out above, such as
the amount already expended by the lessee; the prospect or expec-
tation of ultimate profit; probable quantity of oil or gas capable of
being ultimately produced as indicated by prior development; the
character of the subsurface structure and sands in that area; facts
derived from geological and geophysical operations in that area; the
extent and result of operations on adjacent lands; improved methods
of operation and development; market conditions and transportation
facilities; the cost of drilling and operating wells; the nature of the
producing formation, whether sand, lime or other formation, and its
thickness, saturation, and general character; and restrictions upon
production under lawful authority of state or federal agencies. All
of these factors and others peculiar to the case before the court have
a bearing on what is "reasonable diligence" and what is a reason-
able delay in development, both of known and untested formations.
It is for the court, in the exercise of its equitable powers to apply
the rule and base its decision upon whatever in the circumstances
would be reasonably expected of operators of ordinary prudence,
having regard to the interests of both lessor and lessee.
'o' Id. at 4.
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